

Verification process to avoid retroactive effects caused by the demolishing by blasting of the cooling towers of Philippsburg power plant

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ABSTRACT

The State Ministry for the Environment, Climate Protection and the Energy Sector of Baden-Württemberg requested proof that the demolition of the Philippsburg nuclear power plant's cooling towers was free of retroactive effects. The blast of the two towers was time staggered in order to avoid vibrations, which were induced into the soil by the collapse of the towers from being superimposed. The demolition was accompanied by measurements of vibration velocities at representative locations (open field and building) which proved that in advance determined limits were not surpassed.

This paper summarizes the verification process that ensures that there were no retroactive effects with regard to the vibrations caused by the collapse of the cooling towers. First, the definition of the desired level of security is discussed. The verification strategy is then examined. Particular attention is paid to the determination of reliable vibration predictions and numerical simulations of the structural behavior of the pre-damaged towers under wind and vibrations caused by the collapse of the first tower to be demolished (an uncontrolled collapse of the briefly remaining tower had to be avoided).

These examinations were conducted by SMP using finite element models of one cooling tower (see figure 1). The models included material and geometrical non-linearities and were performed under dynamic loading. Concrete cracking and consideration of reinforcement as embedded elements was partly implemented too.

The dismantling took place on May 14th 2020. Accompanying measurements showed that the level of induced vibrations were clear below the before defined tolerable level.

Introduction

In the course of the resolution from 2002 for the withdrawal from nuclear energy and further resolutions of the Bundestag in connection with the events in Fukushima in 2011, the two reactor blocks of the Philippsburg nuclear power plant were shut down. The first block (KKP1) went offline on March 17, 2011. The second block (KKP2) was shut down on December 31, 2019. In the future, a converter system for electricity from renewable sources will be built on the plant. To ensure the future conversion of the facility, the two cooling towers were dismantled by blasting. Figure 1 shows the powerplant's cooling towers and the predicted area of debris after the dismantling by blasting. It is worth noting that the areas have a certain overlapping. The tower marked with "1" had to be dismantled first to avoid a collision of the towers.



Figure 1 The two cooling towers (yellow) of Philippsburg powerplant and predicted debris area after dismantling

The main data concerning construction details, dimensions and mass of one of the Philippsburg cooling towers is shown in Figure 2 (both towers identical).




Figure 2 Philippsburg cooling tower and dimensions

Because of economic considerations it was decided to dismantle the towers by blasting instead of conventional demolishing. Figure 3 shows the dismantling concept.




Figure 3 Demolishing by blasting concept for Philippsburg cooling towers

First, the cooling towers were pre-damaged (white cutouts) to ensure a defined direction of fall when blasting. At the lower edge of the cooling tower shell, the wall thickness was approx. 75 cm (ring girder - yellow). The girder was excluded from the pre-damaging. The explosive charges were placed in the areas marked in yellow. Half of the total of 96 V-pillars, five areas of the ring girder and the webs in the diagonal cutouts were blown up. Through a so-called tilting-collapse movement, the cooling tower shell was supposed to hit the center of the vibration marked in green as precisely as possible. The impact should completely destroy the cooling tower shell, which was largely intact up to this point in time.

A rough calculation of the potential energy of one tower shows that its collapse releases large amounts of energy. The potential energy of one tower equals $E_{\text{pot}} = 15129 \text{ MNm}$ which corresponds to 3.62 t TNT.

This energy is partly consumed by the collapse process of the cooling tower shell. The main amount of energy is dissipated as ground vibration at the impact of the tower shell on the soil. At the time of the blasting fuel elements are still present on the site and must be actively cooled. The functionality of the corresponding infrastructure on the power plant site had to be ensured. The requirement to prove that the power plant is free of retroactive effects, especially with regard to ground-induced vibrations, was accompanied by the decision to demolish by blasting.

Basic considerations to avoid retroactive effects

SMP Ingenieure im Bauwesen GmbH (SMP) accompanied the demolition of the cooling towers of the Philippsburg nuclear power plant from an expert side. The task of SMP was, on the one hand, to conceptually contribute to the development of a proof concept for the non-retroactivity of the dismantling by blasting, on the other hand, in the structural examination of the corresponding verifications, which were provided by contractors (third parties) of the operator of the power plant.

The proof concept to exclude retroactive effects caused by ground vibrations had to consider the following aspects:

- Avoiding danger to life
- Safe containment of radioactive material
- Ensuring the operation of fuel element cooling

The first mentioned point is about the danger of persons through (partial) collapse of buildings. The second point addresses the structural integrity of affected buildings. The third aspect, which was found to be largely decisive in the course of the investigations, considers the safe operation of relevant infrastructure for cooling active fuel elements stored on the power plant site. Buildings and plant components of relevant infrastructure were identified and classified by third parties according to their distance from the vibration centers (Figure 3 - green dots). The verification objective could be thus limited to the fulfilment of the requirement of a non-exceedance probability of a vibration level at a certain distance from the vibration centers. A location at a distance of 314 m to a vibration center proved to be decisive. This location is also referred to as point of interest (POI) in the following.

The design spectra for the load case earthquake (DEQ spectra) of the affected buildings were used as basis for the limit value of the tolerable vibration level. Basically, a verification concept on free field level was followed, which had two decisive advantages:

- Since all safety-relevant buildings are designed for the same earthquake, all buildings with a distance of more than 314 m to a vibration center are considered covered
- Accreditation of possible additional safety reserves, which can be justified by the usually favorable coupling factor at the transition from free field to foundation level

With regard to the load to be applied, it was decided to work with 95% quantile values. Additional safety factors were implicitly included on the resistance side by the requirement that the safety relevant buildings had not to exceed a proportionate level of the design earthquake. The parties involved agreed on a vibration level of 60 % DEQ in all directional components that should not be exceeded. The verification can thus be summarized as follows:

$$E_{c95,dir} \leq 0.6 \times DEQ_{dir} \quad (1)$$

$E_{c95,dir}$: Characteristic value of the predicted induced ground vibration (95 % quantile) expressed as component spectrum

DEQ_{dir} : Design Earthquake (component) for Philippsburg power plant (according to (KTA 2201.4 2012))

Predicting soil vibrations caused by the impact of the cooling towers

Basically two concepts for the preparation of a vibration prognosis were followed by the operator. Both concepts are based on an existing database of vibration velocity measurements at blast demolitions of hyperbolic cooling towers. The data set included a total of 10 cooling tower blastings and 165 velocity measurements. The data includes both free field and building measurement points. Most of the data were determined for tower blastings with significantly lower energy input (E_{pot}) in comparison to the Philippsburg towers. Evaluation points with mostly shorter distances to the vibration center than 314 m predominated.

The first method represents a forecast model purely on a statistical basis. Here, a forecast formula with two free parameters (E_{pot} and distance to the vibration center) was determined by the contractor. The procedure according to method 1 is explained exemplarily: First, a reference signal from the database is transformed into a spectral representation of the accelerations. The prognosis model requires as input variables the potential energy of a cooling tower of Philippsburg, as well as the distance to the center of vibration (here: 314 m). The prognosis model then provides a scaling factor. This factor is multiplied with the acceleration spectrum over the entire frequency range. This procedure is repeated for several suitable

reference signals. The increase of the spectra to the 95 % quantile level is already taken into account. However, this procedure proved to be too conservative with respect to the prediction quality of the accelerations for larger frequencies. This is due to the fact that the existing data base is dominated by vibration measurements with significantly shorter distances to the center of vibration and therefore an extrapolation of the signal to larger distances had to be performed. Due to the scalar modification of the reference signals over the entire frequency band, the frequency-dependent transmission behavior of the ground vibrations could not be mapped. The transmission behaviour of higher frequency signals was thus overestimated.

On the advice of SMP, the operator therefore decided to pursue an alternative method. This second method should include the transfer behavior of the ground vibrations as a frequency-dependent function (transfer function). The transfer function was determined numerically with the program Sassi. The input parameters were obtained from the existing soil expertise on the one hand and from shaker tests (Figure 4) on site on the other hand. The numerically determined transfer function for a signal transferred to the POI is shown in Figure 4. The procedure according to method 2 is explained exemplarily: First a reference signal from the database is transferred into a spectral representation of the accelerations. Then a scaling of the spectrum to take into account the existing potential energy of a cooling tower of Philippsburg with a factor over the whole frequency band is performed. Then a frequency-dependent adjustment of the reference signal is performed using the transfer function, which takes into account the distance of the reference signal from the POI. Furthermore, the procedure is analogous to method 1. Independent comparison calculations by SMP provided forecast spectra which differed less than 20 % from those of the operator. The acceleration spectra determined at the POI for the free field with method 2 were considered as the decisive basis for evaluation in the further course of the proof of the absence of retroactive effects.




Figure 4 Numerically determined transfer function

Using method 2 it could be shown that the requirements according to Equation 1 could be met. However, this was only under the condition that there is no significant superimposition of the ground vibrations caused by the two collapse processes of the cooling towers. This circumstance is taken up again in the corresponding section.

Structural behavior of a single cooling tower

Investigations of the pre-damaged towers under wind load and the demolishing process

As the blasting required a pre-damaging of the towers it was also necessary to analyse the damaged state under wind loading. Due to the relative short time between the pre-damaging and the blasting, the design

wind load could be reduced in comparison to standard ULS analyses. Due to the required verification objective (Equation 1) it was also necessary to analyze the collapse process of the towers immediately after the blasting of the towers in advance in order to exclude an uncontrolled collapse process caused by the blasting as far as possible.

An uncontrolled collapse could have caused a shift of the center of vibration to any point of the lower ring girder, which would have fundamentally changed the vibration prediction at the POI. Also the predicted debris corridor (Figure 1) could have shifted, which would have had a strong impact on safety aspects other than ground-induced vibration.

To exclude the possibility of an uncontrolled collapse of the towers due to wind load during the pre-damaged state of the towers or during the blasting itself, SMP carried out finite element simulations using the software Abaqus. A numerical model of a cooling tower was created. The cooling tower shell was discretised by means of two-dimensional shell elements. The columns were discretised as beam elements. The support conditions were varied to adequately account for the not exactly quantifiable deformation behaviour of the soil around the column foundations. Within the framework of a best-estimate investigation, mean values of the material characteristics for concrete and reinforcing steel were used for the simulations. A post-hardening of the concrete was also taken into account. Meridian and circumferential reinforcement was modelled using the rebar option for shell elements in Abaqus. A complete failure of the concrete from a compression of 3.5 ‰ was implemented. The material model for the columns was linear-elastic.

The modelling took into account the order in which the load was applied. First the dead weight was applied to the still undamaged tower. Then the pre-damaging was modeled, whereby load transfer effects occurred. Then wind load was applied. After that the blast was modeled by abruptly removing the corresponding columns and ring girder sections.

The proof of the controlled collapse in terms of avoiding collapse of the pre-damaged towers under wind load focused on a structural analysis of the steel stresses and concrete cracking near the pre-damaged areas. Figure 5 shows the results of a numerical simulation for a given wind load direction. In Figure 5 down left the plastic strain indicates concrete cracking at the pre-damaged areas. The corresponding stress in the reinforcement (Figure 5 down right) is up to 308 N/mm² but still below yielding.




Figure 5 Simulation of the pre-damaged tower under wind load: Top: Wind load [N/m²] negative value means pressure – Bottom left: Plastic strain in concrete as envelope; Bottom right: Maximum stress in reinforcing as envelope [N/m²]

The proof of the controlled collapse during the demolishing by blasting process focused on a structural analysis of the columns. Premature failure especially of the columns below the diagonal pre-damaging (critical columns) had to be excluded. It could be shown that the section forces in the critical columns were within their load bearing capacity.

Investigations of the shortly remaining tower under soil vibrations

Investigations by SMP showed that the originally planned time staggering of only a few seconds between the blastings of the cooling towers could lead to considerable interference phenomena in the ground vibrations. Further investigations proved that only after a time offset of about 12 seconds of the blast releases a decoupling of the ground vibrations could be assumed. However, this now considerably longer time window made it necessary to exclude an uncontrolled collapse of the briefly remaining tower caused by the vibrations induced by the first tower.

For this purpose, SMP carried out finite element simulations using time history data on the cooling tower model in Abaqus. The model already presented was therefore reused and the loading was modified.

Time history data was generated for all directional components on the basis of the results for the prediction of the vibration levels. The data was scaled with a safety factor calculated by third parties on basis of (DIN EN 1990 2010). On the safe side, the decisive distance chosen was the shortest distance from the vibration center of the first tower to the nearest column foundation of the second tower. This was approximately 100 m. Then spectrum-compatible time history acceleration data sets were generated which were applied on all column supporting points. The additionally applied wind load was significantly lower than the wind load from the as-built statics. In this way the fact was taken into account that the proof of non-collapse was only to be provided for the relatively short period of time lag between the two blasts. On the safe side, a duration of one day was assumed. The reduction of the applied wind load in comparison to the as-built statics was determined by third parties involved.

The structural analysis focused on the following aspects:

- The in-creasing crack formation in the concrete in the area of the pre-damaging due to the superposition of horizontal wind and vibration loads (*shell integrity*).
- The vertical load of the column foundations due to the superposition of dead weight and vertical vibration components.
- Column load bearing capacity due to the superposition of horizontal wind and vibration loads

Concerning the *shell integrity* the results for the decisive structural analysis is summed up as follows: Plastic strain in the concrete occurred mostly at the area of the vertically pre-damaged part of the shell. Maximum tensile stress in the reinforcing was near the yielding strength which was set to 465 N/mm².

The maximum reaction force (pressure) for all simulations being performed was around 14.8 MN which lead to a degree of utilization for the soil under the foundation of ~ 110 % (Figure 6). This was considered tolerable as all other foundations had much less loading at that specific time.




Figure 6 Reaction forces of the critical foundation in time history analysis

The structural analysis of the columns was also performed. The internal forces were transferred into a moment normal force diagram and compared with the material resistance curve, which was simplified by a polygon course (Figure 7).




Figure 7 Section forces for critical columns under combined wind and vibration loading

Based on the presented results with regard to the tower shell, the foundations and the columns, the proof of the non-collapse of the briefly remaining tower under combined wind and ground vibration load was considered to be provided.

Dismantling by blasting: Results

The blasting of the cooling towers in Philippsburg took place on the morning of May 14, 2020, with the ignition of the charges in each tower occurring practically synchronously. The time offset of the blastings of the two towers was about 12 seconds. The two towers failed exactly as calculated in advance, both with regard to the collapse process and the location of the vibration center. The remaining tower was not visibly affected by the ground vibrations induced by the impact of the first tower.

The demolition of the blast was accompanied by third parties by means of measurement technology in order to check that the previously defined limit vibration level was maintained. An evaluation of the measurement results by SMP for selected measuring points could prove that the required verification target could be clearly met for all directional components. In addition, it was checked for relevant buildings whether the permissible vibration speeds according to (DIN 4150-3 2016) had been observed, which was also the case.

Conclusion

SMP Ingenieure im Bauwesen GmbH (SMP) was involved as peer-reviewer for the dismantling by blasting of the two cooling towers of the Philippsburg nuclear power plant. The task of SMP was, on the one hand, to participate conceptually in the development of a proof concept for the non-retroactivity of the dismantling, on the other hand to cross-check structural examinations of the corresponding proofs, which were provided by contractors (third parties) of the power plant operator.

This paper describes the verification process to minimise retroactive effects with regard to the vibrations caused by the dismantling by blasting of the cooling towers. First, the definition of the chosen level of security is outlined. The verification strategy is then examined. Particular attention is paid to the determination of reliable vibration predictions and numerical simulations of the structural behavior of the pre-damaged towers under wind and vibrations caused by the collapse of the first tower to be demolished (an uncontrolled collapse of the briefly remaining tower had to be avoided)..

Third-party vibration predictions used a method that combined empirical data and numerical simulations. The prediction proved that exceeding the desired safety level, expressed in terms of acceleration spectra, were unlikely. The vibrational predictions implicitly assume that the collapse of the towers will be very controlled and that there will be no significant interference between the induced vibrations of the two towers. Additional investigations were necessary to validate these assumptions.

These examinations were conducted by SMP using finite element models of one cooling tower. The models included material and geometrical non-linearities and were performed under dynamic loading. Concrete cracking and consideration of reinforcement as embedded elements was implemented too. The examination of the first numerical model demonstrated, that a controlled collapse of one cooling tower was very likely and that the pre-damaged towers could withstand their wind load. To exclude interference effects of the soil vibrations a time offset of the two blasts had to be implemented. The second model showed that the briefly remaining tower could withstand the vibrations induced by the first tower and an uncontrolled collapse was unlikely.

Dismantling took place on May 14, 2020. Accompanying measurements showed that the level of the induced vibrations was well below the previously defined tolerable level.

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